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Abstract 
This paper describes a multi-model approach to the description of substation control and monitoring, based 
on the IEC-61850 standard. We present the modeling as a translation from an “engineering” model (the 
standard) to a “user model” (our stakeholder oriented models). After a brief presentation of the Hydro 
Quebec (HQ) context, the public utility where a new IEC-61850 compatible system must be built, we 
present the principle of the Logical Node, the standard’s main element. We have created three UML 
domain models to help stakeholders understand the benefits of the new system. These contain different 
numbers of classes.  Common classes do not have the same attributes and operations are shown only in one 
model. 
The first model is intended for HQ standardization agents and is a synthesis of the IEC 61850 standard with 
modifications to the abstract class Basic Logical Node. Standardization agents must have a good general 
knowledge of all aspects without this knowledge necessarily being in-depth 
The second model has been elaborated for functional engineers and presents a functional viewpoint. In this 
model, non-functional requirements (interoperability and security) are absent. The first and second models 
are not consistent and this lack of consistency is an element for further analysis in the future. The model for 
a breaker is presented to illustrate the fact that the stakeholder sees only what concerns him.. 
The third model is intended for system and maintenance engineers, and is a complement to the second 
model. In this model the system classes and optional attributes linked to interoperability are represented. 
The abstract class basic Logical Node is presented in detail in this model only.. 
A table summarizes the importance of the IEC-61850 standard’s main elements with respect to the 
stakeholders. A fourth stakeholder (the requirements engineer) is introduced in the table. We will also 
highlight the fact that all these models are independent of computer science knowledge and thus can be 
produced by domain experts or by any other person who has a good knowledge of classification methods 
(sociologists, philosophers, etc.). Some concerns about seamless transitions are presented. 
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Introduction 
After a brief description of the context we will present our rationale for choosing a multi-model approach. 
A very short presentation of the concept of the Logical Node found in the IEC-61850 standard will 
introduce the models developed for the main stakeholders: standardization agents, system and maintenance 
engineers and functional engineers. Then we present the problem relied to the interweaving on function and 
non-functional requirements. The conclusion summarize the objectives reached and presents some concerns 
about seamless transitions. 
 
The context  
Hydro Quebec (HQ) is a Canadian public utility whose main mandate is the production and transportation 
of electrical energy. Twelve years ago, HQ was already at the cutting edge with its distributed monitoring 
and control system (SCC-HQ1) based on OSI standard protocols. Because such a system has already been 
in place for so long and stakeholders have become very familiar with it, at HQ, unlike many other public 
utilities, it is not necessary to persuade them of the advantages of a distributed system with a 802.3 LAN. 
What is difficult, at HQ, is to justify changing to a new system which has the same physical and functional 
characteristics as the existing system and which offers, as its only advantage, an improvement in non-
functional requirements. In a company where the technical staff has a real influence on managerial choices, 
and no technical decision is made without their involvement and agreement, it is important that every 
stakeholder be able to participate in the decision-making process with a lucid comprehension of what is at 
stake.  
There are four categories of stakeholders in the SCC-HQ plan (standardization agents, functional engineers, 
system engineers, and software engineers) and they work in four very isolated departments. In addition, we 
must add that the age-old quarrel of “old versus new”, between employees who have been there many years 
and those newly arrived, which is present every time someone proposes a change to the system, is 
particularly strong at HQ, where the system is 12 years old. The “new” employees, in order to create a 
place for themselves (either psychologically or in order to further their careers) over-emphasize the defects 
of the old system and exalt all new technology. In contrast, the affection that the older employees have for 
the system they have used for many years and are familiar with, leads to a certain psychological inertia 
towards any suggested change, causing them to see any change as either risky or downright bad. We have 
not doubled the number of models because of this “quarrel”.  Instead, we have considered “old versus new” 
as something that colors and affects our reaction to the questions raised with respect to models.. 
 
Multi-modeling approach 
There is no perfect system and every system results from a trade-off of some kind or another. In order to 
guarantee that the trade-off springs from a rational choice and is not merely a question of “the squeakiest 
wheel gets the oil”, it is important that those who will be participating in the decision-making process be in 
a position to clearly understand all the issues. In our project, given the short time interval allowed for the 
writing of the System Requirements Specification (3 months), it was important that the new concepts stem 
from the background and knowledge that the stakeholders already have. The stakeholders have different 
visions because of their training, cultural background and organizational status.  It would not be helpful to 
attempt to impose on them an alleged “objective vision”. This is why we have introduced several different 
models. It is very important for us to talk about multi-models rather than simply multi-views of one model. 
These views imply that there is something to see which maintains a unity regardless of the one who is 
observing, and that this “something” is stable from these points of view (just as the famous elephant). In 
contrast, speaking of different models (descriptions) implies that there is no elephant at all, and that each 
model describes as objectively as possible an aspect of the reality that must be automated, and that all the 
aspects are integrated into a unity which is functional and not an “object”. The expression “multi-model” 
emphasizes the fact that the model is just that: a model designed to aid in the stakeholders' understanding 
and not an objective description of a unlikely reality. 
 
                                                 
1 Système de Contrôle et de Commande (Control and Monitoring System). 
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IEC-61850 and Interoperability 
Interoperability is a non-functional requirement, which has an impact not only on performance and 
implementation costs but also on specification complexity. In an organization such as Hydro Quebec, it is 
particularly important to reduce the complexity induced on specifications by interoperability because the 
decision makers are the technical staff (our stakeholders) and not the financial staff. In our case, the first 
step is therefore to simplify the standard on which the system is based.  
IEC is finalizing the publication of fourteen Parts that make up the IEC-61850 standard series. The IEC-
61850’s main objective is to "achieve interoperability between the IEDs supplied from different 
suppliers"[1], where IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Device) are the physical programmable devices 
exchanging data on the substation local area network. 
The standard’s main principle, the one allowing it to approach interoperability systematically, is the 
concept of the Logical Node (LN). The LN is the smallest component (brick) used to build a function, and 
that can be allocated to distinct IEDs. To do so, the data exchanged between LNs are defined formally. 
Interoperability is thus linked to the fact that various LNs carry out normalized sub-functions which 
exchange data, the name, structure and meaning of which are fixed by the standard. The LN is, in practical 
terms, the main concept that all the stakeholders must master quite thoroughly. 
IEC-6850 standardizes 82 LNs. LNs are aggregates of: 
• Data Objects: they represent specific information on the LNs. The number and type of data objects 
are specific for every LN but four data objects are common to all LNs: mode, behavior, health and 
nameplate. Data Objects can be of the standard data type (Integer, Boolean, etc.) or of the 
structured type (Quality,  TimeStamp, etc), which are the Common Data Classes (CDC) defined in 
section 7-3;  
• Data Sets: a group of commonly used data objects; 
• and three other elements facilitating reporting and logging. 
The framework is a client-server framework. The Part 7-2 defines the Abstract Communication Service 
Interfaces (ACSI) that makes the client’s requests independent from programming languages and from 
protocols stack. Parts 8-1 maps ACSI onto Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) application 
protocol. This approach makes the extensions and adaptations generated by technological change easier, 
because ACSI protect application processes from changes. IEC-61850 can be understood and his 
requirements can be implemented without knowing MMS so in our models there is nothing concerning 
communication protocols. 
We do not describe the protection functions even if they are essential for the IEC approach because the 
protection department at HQ decided against building a new system around the IEC-61850 standard2. The 
choice not to provide modeling protection resulted in reducing the number of LNs from 82 to 46. 
Since the IEC-61850 can be considered an engineering model and because we decided to build four 
stakeholder (user3) oriented models, the translation from the original model implies, for every destination 
model, choosing the elements which will be presented and going into greater detail into the elements 
chosen. The main “elements” among which to choose are: Functions (Part 5), ACSI and class models (Part 
7-2), Common Data classes (Part 7-3) LNs (Part 7-4), Data Objects of chosen LN (part 7-4). 
The models are built with UML and published in HTML on a WEB site [4]. 
Part 7-3 of the IEC-61850 standard defines Common Data Classes and part 7-4 defines LNs: they are the 
nucleus of the UML conceptual diagrams. In the standard all the “elements that constitute” the classes are 
presented as attributes without consideration of the attribute type (standard as Integer and Boolean or 
structured as Quality and TimeStamp). We decided to list only the standard ones as attributes.  For example, 
                                                 
2 We can see the SCC as the trojan horse for the introduction of IEC-61850 at Hydro-Quebec. Just as three 
thousand years ago, when discussion and strength are powerless, we must resort to tricks. 
3 We borrow the expressions “engineering model” and “user model” from the domain of human machine 
interfaces : “User” of the standard and not user of the system, of course ! 
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the data object Controllable Double Point, instead of having fourteen attributes has seven attributes and is 
an aggregate of seven objects.  
For all the models we decided to change the representation of the Basic LN (the abstract class from which 
the “functional” LN are derived).  In the Basic LN, we have left the four mandatory attributes, the attributes 
related to interoperability only, and put the seven optional ones in the derived classes. This choice allows us 
to simplify function modeling by “forgetting” the Basic LN attributes in nearly all the diagrams. 
 
Standardization agents model 
Standardization agents, the instigators of the IEC approach, are above all concerned with establishing rules 
for restricting the technological and functional choices of system and functional engineers. They must be 
acquainted with all the elements of the IEC-61850, even if they do not need to know the details. But to be 
acquainted with IEC-61850, even if the standard is well structured and well written, is not so easy4. The 
standard is more than 500 pages long and contains dozen of tables.  
As a result of the feedback received after a six hours course on IEC-61850 and a great deal of discussion, 
the following decisions were taken: 
1. LNs: All LNs presented in Part 7-4 were included without the four mandatory attributes of Basic 
LNs. 
2. ACSI: From the thirteen models presented in Part 7-2 (ACSI), only two (LN et Data) were not 
included because from the point of view of their attributes they are of interest to the 
standardization agents only.  They are therefore described in 1). 
3. Functions: All the functions (Part 5) are described but without emphasis on System support and 
System configuration.  
4. CDCs: All the CDCs were presented. To simplify CDCs, two generalizations were introduced. 
It is important for the standardization agents to be familiar with the rules used to create the new LNs and 
Data Objects presented in Part 7-4. 
 
Functional engineers model 
The functional engineers that we are concerned about here are the engineers responsible for the control 
function and not the engineers responsible for primary equipment. The main concern of the functional 
engineers is that all the functions carried out by the old system are executed by the new system without any 
changes. From a practical point of view, only the answers to two questions are important: 
• Are the functions defined in Part 5 of the Standard that have an impact on the operation of the 
SCC compatible with the old functions? 
• Does every primary equipment data of the old system have at least one corresponding LN 
attribute? 
The answers to these two questions are related because in the Standard, functions and objects are 
intertwined.  That is to say, the LN attributes are used as elements to describe the functions. To map the old 
system data to the IEC-61850 LNs, we extracted a UML model of present day switches from the listings of 
the old system. The results were “strange” in comparison to the standard. At least twenty single points 
statuses of the old system did not have a corresponding attribute in the switch-related LN. What is the best 
way to include these points in the new model? In a new LN that reflect the physical structure of the old 
system or in a standard LN? If the choice is a “standard LN”, which one? XCBR (the breaker) or CSWI 
(the controller)? 
Figure 1 presents a model for HQ functional engineers, using a breaker. The HQ breaker is represented as a 
logical device5. 
                                                 
4 A minimum of two months, full time.  
5  A Logical Device is defined by IEC-61850 as an agregate of LN. 
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Fig. 1 : Breaker logical device 
 
Four important points can be raised concerning this model: 
1. Four LN switch related (XARC, XPDC, CPOW CILO) are absent. Why ? Because the functions 
associated are executed by specialized devices or because the function does not exist at HQ. This 
solution is not consistent with the standardization agents’ model where all LN are present. Instead 
of trying of eliminate dissimilarities between the models by “forcing” the functional engineers to 
accept a more general solution, we preferred to keep the dissimilarities alive as an element for 
later study. At the beginning there was discussions about XGMU too. Why keep this NL if it has 
only one point for HQ ? Would it not be a better solution to put this “isolated” point with the 
others twenty ? In this case we decided that it was important to keep XGMU in the model because 
the respect of the standard imply that if an attribute exist you can’t just introduce the same under 
another name just for… intellectual laziness.  
2. The Report Control is directly attached to HQbreaker. This is not correct because in the standard 
the Report Control belongs to the LNs. Furthermore we do not differentiate buffered from 
unbuffered reports because at HQ all reports are buffered. 
3. All logical devices must have a LLN0 (a logical node responsible xxxx). We don’t represent 
LLN0 because it is of no functional interest. It is a solution to certain problems that arise as a 
result of interoperability. 
4. ECCI is an extended LN introduced to contains the old system status points. 
In summary: a) Because interoperability is not at all important to functional engineers (as far as they are 
concerned, it is simply noise), the system LN and all the features concerning interoperability were not 
presented in their model. b) Because they are interested in present day functions, we presented only the 
IEC-61850 elements concerning current HQ functions. 
 
System and maintenance engineers model  
The model for system and maintenance engineers is the complement of the model for functional engineers. 
The central elements are: 
• Basic LNs with associated functions. These functions are not described in the functional model 
because at HQ operators are not allowed to control LNs; 
• Security; 
• System support functions (network management, time synchronization, etc.); 
that is to say, all the ancillary elements that make exchanges between the logical nodes possible. 
The reports, so important for functional engineers, were presented in this model only from the standpoint of 
flexibility and of their impact on perfective maintenance (the main reason for the introduction of the new 
system). 
Table 1 summarizes the importance of the components described in the standard regarding the stakeholders. 
Low, Ave(rage), High qualify the importance of the component and No means not important at all. We have 
added the s/w engineer as fourth stakeholder, since it is he who will be the main person responsible for the 
activities that follow the modeling of the domain. Since our multi-modeled approach allows every 
HQBreaker 
XCBR CSWI XGMU
ECCI 
Report Control
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stakeholder to concentrate on what he knows, the presence of a requirement engineer, whose main task is to 
describe and validate, is essential., 
 
 ACSI & 
classes 
ACSI 
Reports 
CDC Basic 
LN 
Data 
Classes 
Ancillary 
Functions 
Primary 
Functions 
Stand. Agent Low Low Low Low High Ave Ave 
Funct. Eng. Non High Low Non High Low High 
S. & M. Eng. Low High Ave Ave Low High Ave 
Requir.  Eng High High High High Low Low Low 
Table 1 : Stakeholders versus IEC-61850 components 
The three models allow us to present the non functional requirements (often the requirement’s Cinderella) 
without weighing down the functional part. 
 
Non-functional requirements versus functional requirements 
Even if the main concern of IEC-61850 is interoperability, two other non-functional requirements, security 
and performance, are thoroughly analyzed. If it is clear that performances are non-functional requirements 
(what is a performance if not a function attribute concerning time and space?), the separation between 
functional and non-functional requirements regarding interoperability and security is not so clear. IEC-
61850 is a good example of the transformation of non-functional requirements into functional ones. In the 
case of interoperability, the functional and non-functional are so intertwined that the LN (the brick for 
interoperability) is, in a certain sense, a sub-function.. Security (a secondary non-functional requirement in 
IEC-61850) is described by an LN and two functions (System Security Management and Access Security 
Management). Availability is implicitly described by quality and the mandatory attributes of LN and 
explicitly described by the function Physical device self-checking. 
IEC-61850 demonstrates well the fact that when a non-functional requirement is deeply analyzed it 
becomes a set of functions [3]. 
 
Loc as un example that mapping is not so easy 
Loc is a data class that “indicates the switchover between local and remote operation” [1]. XCBR (the LN 
for the breakers) and CSWI (the LN for the switch controller) have a mandatory Loc (Local Operation) of 
type SPS (Single Point Status). In the old HQ-SCC there was a point DIST indicating that there was a 
switchover. Are Loc and Dist the same thing ? They may or may not be. It depends on the point of view. 
First: Loc is an SPS and SPS is an aggregate with a mandatory attribute (Boolean) and two components: 
Quality and TimeStamp whereas DIST is a Boolean. From a functional standpoint, DIST is equivalent to the 
Boolean of SPS. But it is not equivalent from the standpoint of the SCC availability (Quality) and primary 
equipment maintainability (TimeStamp). Thus in the functional engineers' model we can “forget” Quality 
because it is a concern of system and maintenance engineers and TimeStamp because it is the main element 
of the Events Recorder Function (a function that was introduced and standardized for maintainability more 
than thirty years ago). 
Supposing that Quality and TimeStamp can be “forgotten”, can we map DIST to Loc ? But, which Loc ? 
The one of XCBR or the one of CSWI ? 
A standardization agent put it into XCBR. His reasoning was “When DIST is true, the breaker can’t be 
operated remotely, so…” But DIST indicates the physical position of a toggle switch of an electronic panel 
at the interface between the IED and the breaker and not the position of a toggle switch on the breaker. So 
we can consider DIST the equivalent of CSWI Loc. Yes, that’s seems good… but, why not in a private LN 
as ECCI or… or… 
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From this simple example, beside the main lesson (mapping is difficult and there are multiple mappings), 
we have learned another lesson : the meaning of the data of an old system is often “written” into the code 
and the introduction of a new standard such as IEC-61850 can help to extract the meaning from the code 
and put it into the domain models. 
 
Conclusions 
From a non-functional requirement such as Interoperability follows a lot of functions and objects that make 
the building of a system more complex. This complexity is the price to pay for long-term economy. In this 
paper we have described an approach that transforms the “engineering model” of a very complicated 
standard (IEC-61850) into “user models”  
The multi-model approach facilitates the comprehension of the new concepts by presenting a description 
similar to the “usual” model, the one everyone is already very familiar with. In addition, three secondary 
objectives can be reached: 
1. To avoid pointless discussion about details the importance of which has been exaggerated with the sole 
aim of showing (not necessarily consciously) a thorough knowledge of the system.  
2. To reveal, from the outset, the contradictions between the different models. These contradictions do 
not necessarily need to be eliminated when they are discovered as they allow a deeper, more thorough 
analysis of the domain. 
3. To allow the software engineers to better grasp the different descriptions apart from the users' roles in 
use cases. 
A multi-model approach before the System Requirement Specification allows the validation of all kinds of 
requirements, and not only functional ones. Such a validation comes before use cases, that is to say before 
the system delimitation. In a new complex system with strong dependability requirements, the 
improvement of validation compensates for the costs of producing various models. Such an approach also 
allows a consideration of functional and architectural characteristics which are deeply rooted in company 
policies, characteristics which are made obsolete by technology but which still seem necessary to the 
employees. 
But, from the point of view of software engineering, the main indication of our experience concerns the 
analysis as a “special” domain. The building of “stakeholder-oriented” models allowed us to see in action 
the falseness of the “main truth” of object-oriented software: In an object approach the transition from 
analysis to design is seamless. We arrive at the same conclusion as Jackson in [1]: The seamless transition 
is only a consequence of a lack of analysis and of the confusion between system design and analysis. But, 
more radically than Jackson, we think that if the software engineers don’t leave the “domain” to the domain 
experts or to persons capable of conceptual organization (intelligent people with a first university degree, 
for example) the computerization will always be incorrect and ad hoc: That is to say with unforeseen 
maintenance costs. The presence of “software experts” during the analysis has also the perverted outcome 
of forcing the domain experts to act as software experts (or imitate them). In our case the simple fact of 
creating the models with a software engineering tool such as Rational Rose was a “disaster”. Instead of 
reasoning about “concepts”, the stakeholders began to speak about “classes6”, “methods”, “derivation”, 
“Data base”, all the software stuff that prevent the domain experts from describing the “true things” of the 
domain. Instead of describing what was important for the standardization of SCC functions, they behaved 
as software engineers (or programmers?) fighting with the domain with the "weapons" of the design. 
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